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This paper presents a monetary growth model where limited com-
munication and random relocation create endogenous roles for money
and banks. The economy can exhibit two diﬀerent regimes. In the ﬁrst,
money is a dominated asset and banks economize cash reserves. In the
second, money has the same return as capital and banks use the reserves
as storage. I show that the economy can experience switching between
the two regimes and that cyclical bubbles can occur. In addition, dis-
count window lending is considered as a counter-bubble policy. I also
show that the discount window can simultaneously lead the economy to
the social optimum and stabilize bubbly ﬂuctuations when the economy
is dynamically ineﬃcient.
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11 Introduction
There is a large body of theoretical literature on the interactions between
monetary systems and economic volatility. Many economists attempt to ex-
plain economic volatility within general equilibrium frameworks. The overlap-
ping generations model is one of the most useful methods to explore the exis-
tence of multiple equilibra and indeterminacy, which is the source of endoge-
nous volatility.1 Michel and Wigniolle (2003, 2005) study interesting cyclical
bubbly equilibria in an overlapping generations model with a cash-in-advance
constraint. They show that along an intertemporal equilibrium, the econ-
omy can experience both periods where money is a dominated asset, which are
called Hahn and Solow regimes, and periods where money and capital have the
same return, which are called Tirole regimes. Since periods in Tirole regimes
are ﬁnite, they refer to these periods as temporary bubbles. Here, I address the
following questions: Do temporary bubbles occur in a microfounded model of
money? If so, when? How should the central bank deal with the bubbles? The
goal of this paper is to develop a monetary growth model with frictions that
give rise to a role for money and to answer these questions.
The theory presented here is an overlapping generations model with spatial
separation and random relocation, which was popularized by Schreft and Smith
(1997, 1998). The economy consists of two spatially separated islands, and
some agents are randomly relocated to a diﬀerent island from the one on which
they were born. Since communication between the two islands is limited,
the only asset that relocated agents can use is ﬁat money. Communication
frictions prevent movers from transacting with privately issued liabilities in
the new location. Thus, spatial separation and limited communication create
endogenous roles for money and allow money to be held even when dominated
1See Azariadis (1993), Cass and Shell (1983), and Grandmont (1985).
2in the rate of return. In addition, the stochastic relocations act as shocks to the
agents’ liquidity preferences and create an opportunity for the banks to provide
insurance against these shocks, as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983). Since banks
have an active role in the model, it is possible to consider liquidity injections
or discount window lending as a counter-bubble policy. The clear diﬀerences
between the cash-in-advance model and mine are that money holding has a
microfoundation and banks play endogenous roles in this paper.
The main results of this paper are as follows: (i) the equilibrium in which
money and capital have the same return, which is called a Tirole regime, is a
unique equilibrium when the relocation shock is below a threshold level, while
the equilibrium in which money is a dominated asset, which is called a Schreft
and Smith regime, exists when the shock is greater than the threshold level;
(ii) the economy can experience regime switches only when the equilibrium
in the Schreft and Smith regime exists; and (iii) if the economy is dynami-
cally ineﬃcient, the discount window policy can lead the equilibrium in the
Schreft and Smith regime to the ﬁrst-best allocation and can eliminate the
cyclical bubbles. In this paper, cyclical bubbles are used interchangeably with
temporary bubbles.
The result (i) shows that the level of the relocation shock is quite important
in determining the equilibrium regime. Few studies mention this fact. Result
(ii) conﬁrms the robustness of the temporary bubbles studied by Michel and
Wigniolle (2003) in diﬀerent frameworks. The diﬀerence between Michel and
Wigniolle’s work and this paper is that the existence of an equilibrium in the
Schreft and Smith regime is not a suﬃcient condition for a two-period cycle in
this paper. They show that the existence of a two-period cycle is guaranteed
when there exists an equilibrium in the Hahn and Solow regime. In contrast,
I show that there exists an equilibrium in the Schreft and Smith regime that
cannot experience any cycles. Note that the Hahn and Solow regime in their
3model is equivalent to the Schreft and Smith regime in the model of this paper.
Result (iii) states that the discount window policy not only restores eﬃciency
but also stabilizes the economy. These results can be considered as theoretical
contributions.
Some papers study economic volatility using the overlapping generations
model with random relocation. Bhattacharya et al. (1997) and Schreft and
Smith (1997, 1998) produce a monetary growth model in which banks provide
liquidity and the government issues both money and bonds. They show how
multiple steady states, endogenous volatility, and indeterminacies can arise in
such a framework. Gomis-Porqueras (2000) considers their model but without
bonds, and shows that the equilibrium path experiences endogenous volatility
when agents are suﬃciently risk-averse and when the elasticity of substitution
between capital and labor is relatively low. He points out that the results of
Schreft and Smith depend on the design of monetary policy. Paal and Smith
(2004) construct an endogenous growth model with a collateral constraint and
show the threshold eﬀect in the relationship between inﬂation and growth rate.
In their model, there also exist dynamic equilibrium paths that display oscilla-
tion when agents are suﬃciently risk-averse. The main diﬀerence between all
of these analyses and mine is that they focus on diﬀerent types of equilibrium
indeterminacy. This paper shows that another endogenous volatility, which is
inspired by Michel and Wigniolle (2003), can arise in this framework.
This paper is also related to Antinolﬁ et al. (2001) and Antinolﬁ and Keister
(2006), where the central bank, as a lender of last resort, prints money and
injects it into banks that face high liquidity demands. In their model, the
discount window policy relaxes the liquidity constraints of banks and allows
banks to provide better insurance for depositors. This paper points out that
the discount window has a role not only in relaxing the liquidity constraints
but also in stabilizing bubbly ﬂuctuations. This policy can also allow banks
4to economize cash reserves and to increase investments in capital. I show that
when the economy is dynamically ineﬃcient, this policy can simultaneously
lead the economy to the social optimum and eliminate cyclical bubbles.2
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 analyses the equilibria of the two diﬀerent regimes, and Section
4 studies equilibria with regime switching and economic welfare. Section 5
considers the discount window policy that reduces bubbly volatility. Section 6
concludes.
2 The Model
The economy has the same basic structure as in Schreft and Smith (1997,
1998). Time is discrete and denoted by t = 0,1,2,.... The world is divided into
two spatially separated locations. Each location is populated by a continuum
of agents of unit mass. There is no population growth. Agents live for two
periods and are endowed with one unit of labor that they supply inelastically.
At t = 0, there is a continuum of old agents with unit mass in each location.
Each of these agents is endowed with M > 0 units of ﬁat money, which I
will refer to as “base money.” The stock of base money is constant over time.
As is standard in such literature, I assume that the agents derive utility from
consuming the good only when old. The utility function is given by u(c) = lnc.
The consumption good is produced by perfectly competitive ﬁrms that rent
capital, K, and hire labor, L, from the young agents. I assume that the
production technology is of the Cobb-Douglas form, f(k) = Akα, where k ≡
K/L is the capital-labor ratio. For simplicity, the depreciation of capital is
complete in each period.
2Haslag and Martin (2007) show that if the central bank implements discount window
lending and the Friedman rule, the economy can achieve the social optimum. However, since
the production technology is linear in their model, they consider only the case of dynamic
eﬃciency.
5After receiving the wage and depositing it into a bank, the agents learn
whether they must move to the other location. Let π denote the probability
that an individual will be relocated. The law of large numbers holds and hence
π also represents the measure of movers. The movers redeem their deposits
in the form of money, as this is the only way for them to acquire goods in
the new location. Spatial separation and limited communication generate a
transactions role for money. Money can be valued even if it is dominated in
return. In contrast, the non-movers redeem their deposits in the form of goods.
The stochastic relocations act as shocks to portfolio preferences. Hence, they
motivate banks to insure agents against random liquidity needs, as in Diamond
and Dybvig (1983).
2.1 The Social Optimum
I begin with the ﬁrst best solution in this environment.3 The social planner
can directly control investment and allocation decisions in both locations and
is essentially unaﬀected by communication friction. Let cm and cn denote
the consumption of movers and non-movers, respectively. Eﬃcient allocation
maximizes the steady-state expected utility of a representative agent subject




m) + (1 − π)u(c
n)
s.t. πc
m + (1 − π)c
n + k =f(k).










3Haslag and Martin (2007) consider the problem of a social planner in this environment
with linear storage technology.
6At the optimum, the consumption levels of movers and non-movers are equal-
ized, and the net production is maximized. If the production function has the













2.2 A Banking Economy
The banks take deposits from the young agents and choose how much to
invest in capital, st, and real money balances, mt. The banks promise a gross
real return to pay the movers, dm, and to pay the non-movers, d. Because
of free entry, in equilibrium, the banks choose their portfolio in a way that
maximizes the expected utility of the representative agents, π ln(dm
t wt)+(1−
π)ln(dtwt), subject to the following constraints:
mt + st = wt, (3)
πd
m




(1 − π)dtwt = (1 − θt)
pt
pt+1
mt + Rt+1st. (5)
Equation (3) is the banks’ balance sheet constraint. Equation (4) states
that the real money balances held by the banks must be suﬃcient to satisfy
the liquidity demand from the movers. Equation (5) states that the remaining
money and goods go to the non-movers. Of course, 0 ≤ θt ≤ 1 and the
non-negativity constraint must hold.
Let γt ≡ mt/wt represent the reserve-deposit ratio. Then, the banks’ prob-
lem can be rewritten as
max
γt,θt2[0,1]





















7The optimal choices are given by






= if θt < 1. (7)
The factor markets are perfectly competitive in that the factors of production
are paid as per their marginal product. The rental rate for capital, Rt, and
the real wage at period t, wt, are, respectively,
Rt ≡ R(kt) = αAk
α¡1
t , (8)




An equilibrium of this economy is characterized by the market clearing con-
ditions for money and capital and the optimization of the ﬁrms and banks.
Because the supply of real balances is equal to M/pt and the demand for real




Next, the capital stock at period t + 1 must equal the level of investments at
period t. From the banks’ balance sheet constraint (3), this requires that
kt+1 = st = (1 − γt)wt. (11)
3.1 Schreft and Smith Regime
I ﬁrst consider the case where money is a dominated asset. In this case,
money does not serve as the storage tool, and banks ﬁnance the consumption
of the non-movers only by the capital return. That is, θt = 1 holds, and
8conditions (6) and (7) imply that γSS
t = π. In addition, from (9) and (11), I
obtain the dynamics of kt as follows:
kt+1 = (1 − α)(1 − π)Ak
α
t . (12)
The dynamic properties of this equation are the same as the properties of the
standard Diamond model. The model has a unique positive steady state that
is given by4
k
SS = [(1 − α)(1 − π)A]
1
1−α. (13)
The arbitrage condition between the two assets implies that the real return

























I summarize the result of this subsection as the following proposition.
Proposition 1 When π ≥ (1 − 2α)/(1 − α), there exists an intertemporal
equilibrium in the Schreft and Smith regime. The dynamics of kt monotonically
converge to the steady state kSS.
4In contrast to the model with a cash-in-advance constraint, the equilibrium of this model
does not require an upper limit for relocation shocks. In a model, the cash-in-advance
constraint should not be too restrictive for investment in capital to be positive. For details,
see Crettez et al. (1999).
9Note that condition (17) is equivalent to kSS ≤ k¤. In addition, the con-
sumption of movers and non-movers is given by, respectively,
d
mw(k












Since the returns on money and capital are not equalized, a “wedge” between
the return received by movers and non-movers exists. Clearly, the allocation
given by (13), (18), and (19) is not the social optimum.
3.2 Tirole Regime
Next, I consider the case where money has the same return as capital, i.e.,
pt/pt+1 = Rt+1. Money can be viewed as a rational bubble. In this case,
money can serve as the storage tool and banks can ﬁnance the consumption
of the non-movers using money and the capital return. That is, θt < 1 holds,
and conditions (6) and (7) imply that π = θtγt < γt. Since the equilibrium




Combining (11) and (20) with conditions (8) and (9), I obtain the dynamics








t=0 satisfying (21) is characterized by the equilibrium in the
Tirole regime, and the corresponding sequence of kt is given by
kt+1 = (1 − α)(1 − γt)Ak
α
t . (22)











As Tirole (1985) points out, this steady state exists only if the economy is
dynamically ineﬃcient, such that α < 1/2 that is equivalent to (1 − 2α)/(1 −
α) > 0, and achieves the golden rule. The only diﬀerence between Tirole’s
condition and mine is that the bubbly steady state in this model requires a
suﬃciently low relocation shock, such that π < (1−2α)/(1−α). The following
proposition summarizes the result of this subsection.
Proposition 2 When π < (1 − 2α)/(1 − α), there exists an intertemporal
equilibrium in the Tirole regime. The dynamics of kt monotonically converge
to the golden rule k¤.
In the steady state of this regime, consumption of movers and non-movers










Clearly, the steady-state allocation of the Tirole regime given by (24) and
(25) achieves the social optimum.
4 Equilibria with Regime Switching
Like Michel and Wigniolle (2003), I address the following question: Can the
economy switch from one regime to another along an equilibrium trajectory? A
change in regime implies that π ≥ (1−2α)/(1−α). When π < (1−2α)/(1−α),
5Of course, there also exists a continuum of inﬂationary equilibria that are not Pareto
eﬃcient. Along these equilibria, the reserves of banks go to zero and the consumption level
of movers becomes zero. For simplicity, I ignore these equilibria here.
11a regime change cannot occur, and the economy will remain in the Tirole
regime throughout.6 This is the unique intertemporal equilibrium.
4.1 The Two-Period Cycle
I ﬁrst consider a two-period cycle. Let us assume that the economy is in
the Schreft and Smith regime in period t − 1, shifts into the Tirole regime
in period t, shifts back to the Schreft and Smith regime in period t + 1, and
again shifts into the Tirole regime in period t + 2.... The two-period cycle is
represented as (π,φ(π)). Starting from γt = π, the Tirole regime in period t
and the Schreft and Smith regime in period t + 1 imply
γt¡1 = π, γt = φ(π), and γt+1 = π. (26)
For equilibrium in the Tirole regime to exist, φ(π) < 1 is required. Oth-
erwise, the wage income of generation t + 1 is zero and no one receives any
money. This is inconsistent with the optimal solution of generation t.







< π < 1 − α. (27)
According to Michel and Wigniolle (2003), if there exists an equilibrium such
that the cash-in-advance constraint is binding, a two-period cycle is always
guaranteed. The reason is that the two-period cycle condition is equivalent
to the initial parameter restriction of the cash-in-advance constraint. In con-
trast to the model with the cash-in-advance constraint, when π ≥ 1 − α that
is equivalent to φ(π) ≥ 1, the equilibrium in the Schreft and Smith regime
cannot experience a regime switch. In the model of this paper, the existence
of equilibrium in the Schreft and Smith regime is not a suﬃcient condition
6Suppose that the economy shifts into the Schreft and Smith regime in period t. Then,
γt = π holds. Under the condition π < (1 − 2α)/(1 − α), however, the rate of return of
money strictly dominates that of capital, which is a contradiction to the optimal solution.
12for the two-period cycle; this is the clear diﬀerence between the Michel and
Wigniolle model and mine.
4.2 The (p + n)-Cycle
Let us now consider the more general cyclical bubbly equilibria. Speciﬁcally,
I consider a (p+n)-cycle such that for p consecutive periods, the economy is in
a Schreft and Smith regime, and for n consecutive periods, in a Tirole regime,
with p ≥ 1 and n ≥ 1. This cycle is represented by the following form:








Since φn(π) is the positive solution of diﬀerence equation (21) with the initial







α )n − 1¡α
2α¡1
.
The condition φn(π) < 1 is equivalent to π < πn, where
πn =
(2α − 1)(1 − α)n
αn+1 − (1 − α)n+1.
Since φn(π) is increasing in n, φn(π) < 1 implies that φi(π) < 1 for all i ≤ n.







< π < πn. (28)
Since πn is decreasing in n, a (p+n)-cycle with a large n is a rare equilibrium
for the given π. Note also that (28) is equivalent to (27) when n = 1. Figure
1 illustrates the (p+3)-cycle in the case of a dynamically ineﬃcient economy.
The following proposition summarizes the main ﬁndings of this paper.
Proposition 3 When max{0,(1 − 2α)/(1 − α)} < π < πn, there exists an
equilibrium where for p consecutive periods, the economy is in the Schreft and
Smith regime, and for n consecutive periods, in the Tirole regime. Along this













Figure 1: The (p + 3)-cycle in the case of α < 1
2
Proposition 3 shows an indeterminacy of equilibrium because p and n are
determined by the agents’ expectations. Their coordinated expectations have
real eﬀects on the economy through the change in the banks’ portfolio. As
Michel and Wigniolle (2003) point out, such expectations can be coordinated
by sunspots. I can then conclude that cyclical equilibria and sunspot equilibria
can exist in an overlapping generations model with spatial separation and
random relocation.
4.3 The Welfare Eﬀects of Temporary Bubbles
Let us next consider the welfare analysis of bubbles. Figure 2 illustrates
the expected utility of the representative agent of the (p + n)-cycle with
n = 0,1,2,3 when the (p+3)-cycle is possible. I refer to the expected utility as
“welfare.” Each cyclical bubble occurs at period t only once after the economy
14is in the steady state of the Schreft and Smith regime for p consecutive peri-
ods. If the economy experiences no cyclical bubbles, the steady state welfare is
-1.1258.7 The solid line represents the welfare of generations t−1 through t+4
when the (p+3)-cycle occurs. We see that under the (p+3)-cycle, welfare rises
sharply and then falls. As compared to the welfare of the economy that does
not experience any bubbles, the (p + 3)-cycle provides beneﬁt for generations
t, t+1, and t+2, but causes a signiﬁcant loss for future generations after t+3.
Agents of generation t can coordinate their expectation and create bubbles.
They can increase asset returns by reducing their investments in capital and
demanding money. As a result, the welfare of generation t increases since they
can increase asset returns and the degree of risk sharing while keeping the wage
income at w(kSS). Generation t + 1 can also increase their welfare by reduc-
ing investments and demanding money. Note that increases in asset returns
make up for the wage loss caused by the investment reduction of generation t.
Generation t + 2 is in the same situation as generations t and t + 1, and can
increase their welfare by reducing investments signiﬁcantly. However, bubbles
must burst at t + 3 because generation t + 3 can not demand bubbles more
than their wage income. Since the bubbles crowd out the capital stock, the
negative eﬀect of bursting bubbles on welfare for future generations depends
on the scale of the bubbles. As compared to the welfare of the (p + 1)-cycle
and the (p + 2)-cycle, the (p + 3)-cycle has a substantial negative impact on
welfare for future generations after t + 3. Figure 2 indicates that prolonged
bubbles develop a large welfare gap between the top and bottom and cause
signiﬁcant welfare losses for future generations after the bubbles burst.
The following interesting questions now arise: which cyclical bubbles are
likely to emerge? Can the (p+1)-or (p+2)-cycle occur when the (p+3)-cycle is
7I set α = 2/5, π = 5/13 and A = 1. Of course, these parameters satisfy the condition
(28) with n = 3.
























Figure 2: The welfare eﬀects of cyclical bubbles
possible? To answer these questions, I adopt the principle that each generation
decides whether to support bubbles to maximize their welfare. Then, it is easy
to show that generations t + 1 and t + 2 always support bubbles. Figure 2
indicates that generations t+1 and t+2 can increase their welfare by supporting
bubbles rather than bursting them. In addition, generation t always has an
incentive to create bubbles because the welfare it maintains in the steady state
is lower than the welfare brought about by bubble creation. As a result, the
bubbles are created by generation t and bought by generations t + 1 through
t+3, then burst. The (p+3)-cycle is the most likely scenario when condition
(28) with n = 3 holds. This result will be extended in a more general form.
That is, when condition (28) holds, the economy experiences the (p+n)-cycle,
which features the most prolonged bubbles. These results provide a stabilizing
role for central banks.
165 Discount Window Policy
As seen in the previous section, the equilibrium in the Schreft and Smith
regime is in under-accumulation (kSS ≤ k¤) and is prone to bubbly cycles.
The bubbles reduce capital accumulation and accelerate the degree of under-
accumulation. In addition, the bubbles cause signiﬁcant welfare losses for
future generations after they burst. I now consider the following question:
Is it possible to rule out temporary bubbles with an appropriate monetary
policy? In contrast to Michel and Wigniolle (2005), I consider the discount
window policy as a counter-bubble policy, following Haslag and Martin (2007).8
In practice, a bubble crash in a developed economy leads the central bank to
inject liquidity into the banking system to oﬀset a credit crunch. The practice
is often chosen ex post once the credit crunch is underway. In contrast, this
paper focuses on the ex ante roles of the discount window, which reduces cash
reserves of banks and increases investments in capital. The timing of central
bank loans is as follows. At the end of each period, banks can borrow money
for movers from the central bank. Then, in the next period, banks sell goods
to movers from the other island and obtain the money necessary to repay
the central bank loans. For simplicity, discount window loans are made at a
nominal interest rate of zero, but with a limit on borrowing.
5.1 The Dynamically Ineﬃcient Economy: α < 1/2
Consider the situation where the economy is initially in the Schreft and
Smith regime (π ≥ (1−2α)/(1−α)) and is dynamically ineﬃcient (α < 1/2).
Let bt denote the loan received from the central bank at period t. It is assumed
8Michel and Wigniolle (2005) consider the situation where the central bank can control
the money growth rate to rule out bubbles. This policy will also work in my model. In
this paper, however, I do not change the money growth rate to obtain diﬀerent policy
implications.
17that there is a cap ¯ b on the amount a bank can borrow, so bt ≤ ¯ b. Equations






(mt + bt), (29)




Equations (29) and (30) contain the terms of a bank’s borrowing from the
central bank and repayment to the central bank, respectively. Because money
is a dominated asset in the Schreft and Smith regime, it is always optimal for
banks to borrow as much money as possible such that bt = ¯ b. Then, the banks’
problem is to maximize the expected utility of agents subject to (3), (29), (30)
and bt = ¯ b.














where It ≡ Rt+1pt+1/pt denotes the gross nominal interest rate between t and
t + 1. Since discount window loans are perfect substitutes for cash reserves,
the optimal reserve-deposit ratio is decreasing in ¯ b. Thus, the central bank can
control the cash reserves of banks by changing the loan limit ¯ b.
In an equilibrium, the market clearing conditions for money and capital,
(10) and (11), respectively, must hold. Therefore, the equilibrium can be
characterized as sequences {kt,mt,It}1
t=0 that must satisfy
kt+1 = (1 − π)w(kt) +¯ b
·












mt = πw(kt) −¯ b
·





In the steady state, the inﬂation rate is zero, i.e. I = R(k), and the level of
capital stock, k, is the solution to the following equation:
k = (1 − π)w(k) +¯ b
·











1 − π + π
R(k)
i
(1 − α)(1 − π)w(k) +¯ b
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This result states that the capital stock of the steady state, k, is increasing in
the cap, ¯ b. The intuition is simple. As ¯ b increases, banks can decrease cash
reserves and increase the amount of goods invested.
Let us now consider the stabilization policy that restores eﬃciency and elim-
inates cyclical bubbles. Speciﬁcally, consider the policy that the central bank
sets ¯ b to satisfy γSS = (1 − 2α)/(1 − α) in Figure 3. In this case, the values k































If the central bank sets and announces ¯ b = ¯ b¤, the banks borrow as much
money as possible from the central bank and are able to reduce their cash
reserves and increase investments until the level of capital becomes the golden
rule. Under this policy, the steady state in the Schreft and Smith regime is
equivalent to that in the Tirole regime. This implies that the economy never
experience cyclical bubbles.










Clearly, the allocation deﬁned by (37) and (39) is equivalent to the ﬁrst-best
allocation. In the steady state, the appropriate loan limit allows banks to
19increase investments in capital while keeping perfect risk sharing. I summarize
this result in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the economy is initially in the Schreft and Smith
regime and dynamically ineﬃcient. The equilibrium in which the central bank










Figure 3: The discount window policy: α < 1/2
5.2 The Dynamically Eﬃcient Economy: α ≥ 1/2
Next, consider the situation where the economy is initially in the Schreft
and Smith regime and dynamically eﬃcient (α ≥ 1/2). In this case, there is
no steady state in the Tirole regime that is equivalent to the social optimum,
and the central bank does not have a target allocation to which its policy leads
the economy. Since the economy is in under-accumulation, it is optimal for
20the central bank to increase the loan limit suﬃciently such that banks’ money
demand is zero, so γSS = 0. Under this policy, money does not circulate
between generations. The central bank lends enough money to banks at period
t for all movers so that banks do not need to sell goods to old agents to obtain
money. The money is retired at period t + 1 when banks repay their debts
to the central bank. Since banks can invest all deposits in capital, the capital
stock of the steady state, kSS, satisﬁes k = w(k), which is reduced to
k
SS = [(1 − α)A]
1
1−α.
This is equivalent to the steady-state capital stock of the Diamond nonmone-
tary economy. Note that the condition α ≥ 1/2 is equivalent to kSS ≤ k¤. The
economy is still in under-accumulation and never achieves the social optimum.
However, the cyclical bubbles are eliminated since the steady state is also in
the Tirole regime.
5.3 Discussion
From what has been discussed above, discount window lending is unambigu-
ously beneﬁcial in the economy of the Schreft and Smith regime regardless of
whether the economy is dynamically eﬃcient. Such a policy increases invest-
ments in capital and stabilizes bubbly ﬂuctuations. If there is another friction
that is absent from my framework, such as asymmetric information, however,
the presence of a lender of last resort can generate moral hazard, resulting
in excessive risk taking by banks and therefore greater uncertainty about a
bank’s ability to repay the loan. In this case, there exists a trade-oﬀ between
the beneﬁts from productive eﬃciency and economic stability and ineﬃciency
due to moral hazard.
Another policy that can eliminate bubbly ﬂuctuations is the reserve require-
ment. Under this policy, there exists a trade-oﬀ between productive eﬃciency
21and stability. Consider the situation where the government imposes a reserve
requirement on banks so that γSS ≥ 1 − α. If π < 1 − α, the optimal reserve-
deposit ratio of banks binds 1−α, and the cyclical bubbles are eliminated. Un-
der the reserve requirement, however, the capital stock decreases, and the total
goods for consumption also decrease. Using the previous parameter setting,
the steady-state welfare with the reserve requirement calculated at -1.2419 is
lower than the steady-state welfare without the reserve requirement, -1.1258.
Is this reserve requirement a “good” policy? To answer this question, I must
consider the cost of temporary bubbles. A bubble at some period is beneﬁ-
cial for the generation living during that period because it increases returns
on savings. It is detrimental, however, for following generations because it
reduces capital stock in an economy that is experiencing under-accumulation.
As Michel and Wigniolle (2005) point out, if agents are under the veil of ig-
norance and use a Rawlsian criterion between the diﬀerent periods, they will
prefer to live in the bubbly periods. If agents are suﬃciently risk averse, the
existence of cyclical bubbles reduces “ex-ante welfare.” I conjecture that if the
reserve requirement is not too restrictive and eliminates bubbles, this policy
is justiﬁed by the circumstances. I leave detailed analysis to answer the above
question for future research.
6 Conclusion
This paper studies temporary bubbly equilibria in the monetary growth
model where spatial separation and limited communication create endogenous
roles for money. The model makes three contributions. First, the level of
relocation shock is quite important in determining the equilibrium regime.
High liquidity demands tend to ensure that the economy is in a Schreft and
Smith regime. Second, the existence of the equilibria with temporary bub-
22bles ﬁrst studied by Michel and Wigniolle (2003) is conﬁrmed in a diﬀerent
model in which money holding is microfunded. The value of money increases
for some periods and then falls. The bursting bubbles can cause signiﬁcant
welfare losses for future generations. The economy can experience this event
periodically. Such indeterminacies have not been pointed out in the overlap-
ping generations model with random relocations by Schreft and Smith (1997,
1998). In addition, the model shows that the equilibria with regime changes do
not always exist even when there exists an intertemporal equilibrium in which
money is a dominated asset. In other words, there exists an equilibrium in the
Schreft and Smith regime in which the economy cannot experience any regime
switching. This result is in contrast to that of the model with the cash-in-
advance constraint, and implies that imposing the cash-in-advance constraint
may exclude some sets of equilibria from the research objects.
Finally, the discount window policy can play two important roles: (i) it can
increase productive eﬃciency and (ii) it stabilizes bubbly ﬂuctuations. If the
economy is dynamically ineﬃcient and is in the Schreft and Smith regime,
this policy plays these roles so that the economy achieves the social optimum
and is free from bubbly cycles. In the case that the economy is dynamically
eﬃcient, the policy can stabilize the economy. The main point here is that the
decentralized economy is prone to bubbly ﬂuctuations and that the discount
window is a powerful monetary policy to stabilize these ﬂuctuations.
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